A man stands at a window in first light with a mug in both hands, a blank wall calendar hanging beside him.

How long do I have to claim for an injury, and does anything stop the clock?

The injury period is written separately from the vehicle's, in the same statutes, and it usually starts on a different day. Four legislatures read on what makes it run, what interrupts it, and what does not.

Updated September 22, 2026 Intermediate
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Two questions, and almost nobody asks the second until the first has stopped feeling theoretical. How long do I actually have? And is any of this — the treatment, the paperwork, the months of letters — stopping the clock while it happens?

The first has a number, and it is not ours to give: it belongs to the place you were hurt. The second has no number at all, and it is the one that costs people claims.

The short answer

The limitation period for a bodily injury claim is in the jurisdiction notes rendered below this article, with the event it runs from and the instrument it comes from. Read it, then assume two things until you have checked them: that the period for your vehicle is a different number, and that nothing you are currently doing has paused anything.

That is the practical answer. What follows is why each half of it is true, longest qualification first.

The first qualification: the injury period is drafted separately, on purpose

The cleanest evidence is a statute that sets both numbers in one breath. Florida’s section 95.11 groups actions under headings by length. Under «(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS» sits paragraph (g), «An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property»; under «(5) WITHIN TWO YEARS» sits paragraph (a), «An action founded on negligence», with wrongful death beside it at (e). One section, one drafter, two headings — and the shorter of them is the one the person is under.

England and Wales make the intention explicit, because there the separation has its own section heading. Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 is one sentence: «An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.» Section 11 is headed «Special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries», covers any action where the damages «consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries», and gives three years. The word doing the work is special: personal injury is an exception carved out of the general rule, not an instance of it.

It would be easy to read those two and conclude the person’s clock is always the shorter one. It is not. North Dakota gives six years to both, in consecutive subsections of one section: 28-01-16(4) covers «an action for taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels», 28-01-16(5) «any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract». Spain gives one year to both from a single sentence — the direct action against the insurer for damage suffered «en su persona y en sus bienes» prescribes in a year under article 7.1 of the consolidated motor liability law.

So there are three patterns, not one: shorter for the person, the same for both, and in some rows a property damage period that is shorter instead. That property damage limitation period sits beside the injury one in the jurisdiction notes below, which is where to find out which pattern you are in.

The second qualification: what actually makes the clock start

This is where the property and injury periods stop being the same kind of rule, and it matters more than the number. A damaged car is visible on the day; an injury is often not, and the statutes that take that seriously say so in the accrual rule rather than in the length.

Section 11(4) of the Limitation Act gives three years from «the date on which the cause of action accrued» or «the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured», and section 14 then defines that knowledge as knowledge of four facts: that the injury was significant, that it was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission alleged, the identity of the defendant, and, where someone else is said to have acted, that person’s identity and the facts supporting a claim against the defendant. Significant has its own test — an injury a person «would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings» against a defendant who did not dispute liability and could pay — and section 14(3) reaches knowledge a person might reasonably have been expected to acquire, including from expert advice it was reasonable to seek. Section 2, governing the rest of tort, has none of this.

Spain reaches the same place in five words. Article 1968.2 of the Civil Code prescribes in one year the action for obligations arising from fault or negligence under article 1902 — «desde que lo supo el agraviado», from when the injured person knew — against the general rule in article 1969 that time runs from the day an action could have been exercised.

Florida is the instructive contrast, and it is an absence rather than a rule. Discovery language appears in section 95.11(5) — in (b) for professional malpractice, (c) for medical malpractice, (f) for securities violations — and not in (a), the negligence paragraph an ordinary road collision falls under. That was looked for in the text rather than assumed.

The third qualification: the benefit has a clock of its own, and it is shorter

The clock most readers never hear about is not the tort one. Where a no-fault or first-party injury benefit exists, the statute creating it often gives that benefit its own limitation period, and it can be far shorter than the tort period in the same state. North Dakota is the sharpest example.

Section 26.1-41-19(1) provides that where no benefits have been paid, an action for them «may be commenced not later than two years after the injured person suffers the loss and either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than four years after the accident, whichever is earlier». Two constructions in one sentence, and the claimant is held to the earlier of them. Where benefits have been paid, the period is four years from the last payment — a clock that resets on the insurer’s own act. Subsection 4 states that these periods govern «notwithstanding any limitation prescribed elsewhere in the laws of this state».

Set that against 28-01-16’s six years for an injury to the person and the picture inverts: there the benefit claimed from your own insurer expires long before the claim against the driver who hurt you. Where the dataset holds them, the insurer’s own periods to acknowledge, decide and respond are in those jurisdiction notes too — but they run the other way, are owed to you, and stop none of this.

The fourth qualification: what interrupts it, and what merely feels like it does

Spain’s mechanism is unusual enough to read precisely, because most markets do not have it. Article 1973 of the Civil Code interrupts prescription by an action before the courts, by the creditor’s extrajudicial claim, or by the debtor’s acknowledgement. Article 7.1 of the motor liability law then makes that pre-suit claim compulsory and says what it does: it «interrumpirá el cómputo del plazo de prescripción desde el momento en que se presente al asegurador», and «en el momento en el que se notifique fehacientemente la oferta o la respuesta motivada se iniciará un nuevo plazo de prescripción de un año». Interruption, not suspension — a fresh year, not the remainder of the old one — and it turns on a document the insurer sends, which article 7.2 requires within three months of the claim.

Florida is the other pole. Section 95.051 lists the tolling grounds — absence from the state, a false name, concealment, adjudicated incapacity before accrual, certain payments, a pending arbitral proceeding, and minority in defined circumstances — and then closes the list: «A disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section». A file under active negotiation is not on it.

England does not interrupt either, and puts its safety valve after the fact and in someone else’s hands. Section 33 lets a court disapply the personal-injury limit where it appears «equitable to allow an action to proceed», weighing prejudice to the claimant against prejudice to the defendant, having regard to six matters — among them the length of and reasons for the delay, how much less cogent the evidence has become, and the steps the claimant took to get medical or legal advice. That is a discretion exercised later, on evidence, by a judge, not a rule anyone can count on in advance.

What the calculator will and will not do

The section’s deadline calculator, in its injury mode, turns a published period into a date, with the cited instrument beside each row. That mode shows the injury clock and the clock for a claim against your own insurer — in a no-fault system frequently the same claim — and hides the vehicle period rather than dropping it, saying in the tool itself that the period is hidden, not gone, and runs separately.

What it refuses to do is the useful part. It never computes a business-day count, because it cannot know which days are public holidays in eighty jurisdictions; where a source counts business days it flags the row and says to count them on a calendar yourself. And where a period runs from discovery rather than the accident, it shows no date until you supply that date, because a date of knowledge is the one input nothing in the dataset holds.

What we cannot tell you

We cannot tell you the day your period started: on the statutes above that is either the accident or a date of knowledge defined by a four-part test and decided on evidence, and only you hold the facts that test runs on. Nor whether anything you have done has interrupted it. In one of the four systems read here the answer is in the statute; in another the list of grounds is closed against it; in a third the relief is a discretion applied afterwards. Guessing among those is the failure that is not recoverable.

And two instruments this article wanted are missing. Michigan’s much-cited no-fault limitation, MCL 500.3145, is absent because its legislature’s site did not serve it; Hawaii’s HRS 431:10C-315, which builds its period the other way round on a later-of rule, is absent because its legislature’s site refused. Neither gap is filled from a secondary source.

What the readings do say, taken together, is narrower than a warning and more useful. The instruments that shorten the period for the person are often the same ones that give it a later start, and those that give it no later start are often the ones that will not stop it for anything. The number and the start date are one rule, read together or not at all.

Rules in your jurisdiction

Deadlines, fault rules and minimum coverage differ by state and country. Pick yours to see the rules that apply to this topic.

Select a jurisdiction to see its rules.

Frequently asked questions

Does negotiating with the insurer stop the clock?

It depends entirely on the instrument, and the two read for this article answer in opposite directions. Spain's is explicit: under article 7 of the consolidated motor liability law the claimant's pre-suit claim to the insurer «interrumpirá el cómputo del plazo de prescripción desde el momento en que se presente al asegurador», and when the reasoned offer or reasoned reply is formally notified «se iniciará un nuevo plazo de prescripción de un año» — interrupted and restarted, not paused. Florida's is a closed list: section 95.051 enumerates the grounds that toll a period and then says that «a disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section», and a negotiation is not among them. So the honest general answer is the cautious one — assume it does not, and confirm in writing that it does before relying on it.

Why is the deadline for my injury shorter than the one for my car?

Where it is shorter, it is shorter because a legislature wrote it that way on purpose, in the same statute, as a special case. England and Wales set six years for an action founded on tort at section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980, and then carve out personal injuries at section 11 — the section is headed «Special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries» — at three. Florida lists an action founded on negligence among its two-year actions and an action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property among its four-year ones. But it is not universal. North Dakota gives six years to both, in consecutive subsections of the same section. Whether the two differ where you are, and by how much, is in the jurisdiction notes rendered with this article.

The injured person is a child. Does the period wait?

Usually something happens, and what happens differs so much that assuming is dangerous. England and Wales suspend the running period entirely while a person is under a disability, which includes being a minor, and then allow three years from the day the disability ends for a personal-injury action rather than the six years other actions get. North Dakota also stops the clock for a person under eighteen, caps the extension at five years for other disabilities but not for infancy, and allows no more than a year after the disability ceases. Florida is narrower than either: minority tolls only during a period in which a parent, guardian or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor, or is adjudicated incapable of suing. Three legislatures, three different answers, and none of them is the default the others would assume.